The Freedom To Break Laws: A David Lewis Conundrum

In his paper 'Are We Free to Break the Laws?', David Lewis explores the philosophical debate between compatibilism and incompatibilism, specifically addressing Peter van Inwagen's 'Consequence Argument'. Lewis' key contribution is his distinction between the 'weak' and 'strong' theses regarding the ability to break laws of nature. The weak thesis asserts that one can perform an action that results in a law of nature being broken, without requiring the action itself to break the law. Conversely, the strong thesis suggests that the action directly breaks the law. Lewis argues that compatibilists need only appeal to the weak thesis, which does not imply an incredible ability to break natural laws. This distinction is crucial to understanding Lewis' stance on free will and determinism, as it allows for the possibility of performing actions that result in broken laws without requiring humans to possess extraordinary powers.

Compatibilism and soft determinism

Compatibilism is the view that free will and determinism are compatible, meaning that it is possible to affirm both without contradiction. Soft determinism, as defined by Lewis, is the position that "sometimes one freely does what one is predetermined to do". In other words, a person can act freely even if their actions are causally determined by prior events and the laws of nature.

Lewis's version of soft determinism involves what he calls the "Weak Thesis" and the "Strong Thesis". The Weak Thesis states that a person can render a law false in the weak sense, meaning they are able to do something that, if done, would result in a law being broken, even if their action itself does not directly break the law. The Strong Thesis, which Lewis rejects, states that a person can render a law false in the strong sense, meaning their action itself constitutes a violation of a law.

Lewis argues that compatibilists need only appeal to the Weak Thesis to defend the possibility of free will within a deterministic universe. He acknowledges that this position may seem counterintuitive, as it implies that people can sometimes act in ways that break the laws of nature. However, he maintains that this consequence is not as incredible as it may first appear.

Lewis's compatibilism and soft determinism have been influential in the philosophy of action and free will, offering a way to reconcile the seemingly conflicting notions of freedom and determinism.

The weak and strong theses

In his paper, "Are We Free to Break the Laws?", David Lewis distinguishes between the weak and strong theses in the context of compatibilism and soft determinism.

The weak thesis states: "I am able to do something such that, if I did it, a law of nature would be broken." In other words, it suggests that an individual can perform an action that results in the violation of a law, without necessarily having the ability to directly break or change that law. This thesis is compatible with soft determinism, which asserts that individuals can freely perform actions predetermined by past history and the laws of nature.

On the other hand, the strong thesis states: "I am able to break a law." This thesis implies that individuals possess the ability to directly contravene or alter the laws of nature themselves. Both Lewis and van Inwagen agree that it is "incredible" to assume that humans have such an ability to break laws in this strong sense.

The distinction between the weak and strong theses is crucial to Lewis's argument. He asserts that compatibilists only need to appeal to the weak thesis to uphold their position. According to Lewis, the weak thesis allows for the possibility of performing an action that leads to the violation of a law, without requiring the assumption that humans can directly break or alter the laws of nature. This distinction is important because it addresses the concern that compatibilism might imply an "incredible" ability to break laws in the strong sense.

Lewis's defence of compatibilism does not require the assumption that humans have miraculous or supernatural powers. Instead, he argues that compatibilism is consistent with the weak thesis, which acknowledges the possibility of performing actions that result in the violation of laws without breaking them directly.

The Consequence Argument

In his paper, "Are We Free to Break the Laws?", David Lewis defends compatibilism against the consequence argument, one of the most prominent arguments for incompatibilism. Lewis' argument focuses on the distinction between the weak and strong theses of breaking a law.

Lewis agrees with van Inwagen that it is implausible to think that humans can directly break the laws of nature in a strong sense. However, he argues that compatibilists only need to appeal to the ability to break a law in a weak sense. The weak thesis states that one can do something that, if done, would result in a law being broken, even if the act itself does not directly break the law. For example, if someone throws a stone faster than the speed of light due to a "miracle" that enables them to do so, they have broken a law of nature in the weak sense, as their action resulted in a law being broken, even though the miracle, not their action, is what truly broke the law.

Lewis' argument hinges on the idea that compatibilists need not claim any incredible powers to defend their position. By distinguishing between the weak and strong theses, he shows that it is possible to uphold compatibilism without requiring humans to possess the ability to directly break the laws of nature. This move preserves a notion of free will that is compatible with determinism, as it allows for the possibility of acting otherwise, even in a deterministic world.

However, critics of Lewis' argument point out that it relies on the controversial weak thesis, which some find counterintuitive and unsatisfying. Additionally, some argue that the type of free will defended by Lewis, which depends on external "miracles", may not be as compelling as other conceptions of free will, such as sourcehood free will.

The possibility of time travel

In his work, David Lewis concludes that time travel is possible. This is one of several conclusions reached by Lewis in a collection of 13 papers written on a variety of topics, including causation, counterfactuals, and the direction of time.

Lewis's work on time travel is titled "The Paradoxes of Time Travel", in which he defends the conceptual and metaphysical possibility of time travel. Lewis's work on this topic is part of a broader "prolonged campaign" for a philosophical position he calls "Humean supervenience". This position asserts that "all there is to the world is a vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact", with all global features of the world supervening on the spatiotemporal arrangement of local qualities.

In addition to his work on time travel, Lewis also explores counterfactual dependence, subjective and objective probability, explanation, perception, free will, and rational decision. His conclusions in these areas include the claim that counterfactual dependence is asymmetrical, that events are properties of spatiotemporal regions, and that causation can be analysed in terms of counterfactual dependence between events.

The role of miracles

In David Lewis' "Are We Free to Break the Laws?", the philosopher distinguishes between the "weak thesis" and the "strong thesis".

The weak thesis states that "I am able to do something such that, if I did it, a law of nature would be broken". In other words, it is possible for a person to perform an action that would result in a broken law, but the action itself does not break the law. This is the position that Lewis, as a soft determinist, accepts.

The strong thesis, on the other hand, asserts that "I am able to do something such that, if I did it, it would constitute a law of nature’s being broken or would cause a law of nature to be broken". Here, the action performed by the individual directly breaks or causes a violation of a law. Lewis rejects this thesis as it implies an "incredible" ability for humans to contravene the laws of nature.

Lewis' argument revolves around the concept of "soft determinism", which holds that individuals can freely choose to act in a manner predetermined by past history and the laws of nature. This perspective is compatible with the weak thesis, as it acknowledges the possibility of performing actions that result in broken laws without requiring those actions to inherently break the laws themselves.

The weak and strong theses have been a subject of debate, with some finding Lewis' argument decisive, while others question the relevance of his version of free will that relies on "miracles" outside human control.

In summary, the role of miracles in David Lewis' argument is to provide a framework for understanding free will and determinism that does not require humans to possess incredible powers. Miracles enable the weak thesis, which states that individuals can perform actions that result in broken laws without those actions themselves breaking the laws. This perspective, known as soft determinism, offers a nuanced understanding of the interplay between free will and the laws of nature.

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