Gavin Howe
The Fourth Amendment rights in the U.S. Constitution allow individuals to waive their rights and consent to a search of their person or property, even if the officer has not complied with the Amendment. The prosecution must prove that consent was given voluntarily and that the individual was aware of their right to refuse consent. While police are not required to inform individuals of their right to refuse, consent will not be regarded as voluntary if the officer asserts their official status and the individual yields because of this. Consent can be revoked at any time during a search, except in the cases of airport passenger screening and prison visitation. The Supreme Court has also ruled that a search is valid if the police reasonably believe that the consenting party has authority over the premises, even if this belief is incorrect.
Some notable cases include Illinois v. Rodriguez (1990), Fernandez v. California (2014), and US v. Watson (1976).
| Characteristics | Values |
|---|---|
| Voluntariness of consent | The prosecution must prove that consent was given voluntarily and without coercion. Actual knowledge of the right to refuse consent is not essential for a search to be found voluntary. However, consent is not considered voluntary if it is obtained through deception or if the officer asserts their official status and the individual yields due to this factor. |
| Right to refuse consent | Individuals have the right to refuse consent and, except in limited cases such as airport passenger screening and prison visitation, may revoke consent at any time during the search. Police are not required to inform individuals of their right to refuse, but some states and cities have passed laws requiring this notification. |
| Authority to consent | Consent can be given by a party other than the defendant in some cases. For example, a co-occupant's consent is sufficient to override the objection of another co-occupant who is arrested and removed from the premises. However, in Illinois v. Rodriguez (1990), the Supreme Court held that consent is invalid if the police incorrectly believe the consenting party has authority over the premises. |
| Implied consent | Implied consent laws state that individuals engaging in certain regulated activities have implicitly agreed to specific searches related to those activities. For example, motorists may be required to consent to blood alcohol concentration testing when arrested or suspected of drunk driving. |
| Consent during custody | Consent obtained while an individual is in custody can still be considered voluntary, even if they are not informed of their right to refuse. However, if an individual is aware of the police's authority to search with a warrant, subsequent consent may not be considered voluntary. |
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What You'll Learn
Illinois v. Rodriguez (1990)
In Illinois v. Rodriguez (1990), the respondent, Edward Rodriguez, was arrested in his apartment and charged with possession of illegal drugs. The police had entered the apartment without a warrant, with the assistance of Gail Fischer, who had represented that the apartment was "ours" and that she had clothes and furniture there. Fischer also unlocked the door with her key and gave the officers permission to enter.
The trial court granted the respondent's motion to suppress the seized evidence, holding that Fischer did not have common authority over the apartment as she had moved out. The Illinois Supreme Court held that Fischer did not have the authority to consent to the officers' entry.
However, the United States Supreme Court overturned this decision, holding that a third party's consent to an entry and search is valid, even if the third party is not legally authorized to consent, if it is reasonable for the police officers to believe the consent to be valid. In other words, the constitutional validity of a police determination of consent to enter is not judged by whether the police were correct in their assessment, but by "reasonableness." The Court noted that "reasonableness," not consent, is the touchstone of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence; the Constitution only prohibits "unreasonable" searches and seizures.
The Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches, but that a police action can be reasonable even if the police have made a mistake regarding the facts. The Court also emphasized that the test was not whether the party actually had any authority over the premises, but rather whether it was reasonable for the police to believe that consent was granted from a party with authority.
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Georgia v. Randolph (2006)
In the case of Georgia v. Randolph (2006), the Supreme Court of the United States ruled on the validity of a warrantless search of a defendant's residence based on consent given by one occupant, despite the refusal of consent by another physically present occupant.
The case involved Scott Fitz Randolph, who was indicted on a charge of possession of cocaine. The police conducted a search of his home after obtaining consent from his estranged wife, who was also an occupant of the residence. Randolph was present at the time and unequivocally refused to give consent to the search. He filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized, arguing that the Fourth Amendment barred the search of his residence over his objection.
The trial court denied Randolph's motion, ruling that his wife had "common authority to grant consent for police to search the marital home." The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed this decision, distinguishing the case from United States v. Matlock (1974), where the defendant was not present during the search. The State Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' ruling, holding that consent given by one occupant is not valid if another physically present occupant refuses consent.
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed with the State Supreme Court, drawing a "fine line" between this case and Matlock. It held that in cases where both joint occupants are present, a physically present co-occupant's stated refusal to permit entry renders a warrantless entry and search unreasonable and invalid as to that occupant. This ruling recognized the complexity of human life and the inherent qualification of individual privacy interests when choosing to live with another person.
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US v. Watson (1976)
In the case of United States v. Watson (1976), the defendant, Watson, was charged with possessing stolen mail. The case revolved around the validity of a warrantless arrest and the subsequent consent given by Watson to search his car.
On August 17, 1972, a reliable informant notified a postal inspector that Watson was in possession of a stolen credit card. The informant agreed to set up a meeting with Watson, during which he would signal to the authorities if Watson had more stolen cards. The meeting took place at a public restaurant under the surveillance of two postal inspectors. Upon receiving the prearranged signal from the informant, postal officers made a warrantless arrest of Watson, removed him from the restaurant, and gave him Miranda warnings.
During the search of Watson's person, no credit cards were found. However, Watson gave consent for a search of his nearby car, which was done after he was cautioned that any evidence found could be used against him in court. Two additional stolen credit cards were discovered in the car, and Watson was charged with possessing stolen mail.
Before the trial, Watson moved to suppress the evidence found in his car, arguing that his warrantless arrest was invalid and that his consent to search the car was involuntary as he was not informed he could withhold consent. The trial court denied the motion, but the appellate court reversed this decision, deeming the warrantless arrest unconstitutional and Watson's consent to be coerced and invalid.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, and the majority opinion held that Watson's consent was voluntary. They considered the totality of the circumstances, including the absence of proof that Watson knew he could withhold consent, his custodial status, and the fact that he had been given Miranda warnings. The Court's decision set a precedent that actual knowledge of the right to refuse consent is not essential for a search to be considered voluntary.
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Bumper v. North Carolina (1968)
During the trial, it was revealed that four police officers had obtained the rifle by searching the home of Bumper's grandmother, who was a 66-year-old widow living in a rural area. The officers arrived at the home and announced that they had a warrant to search the premises. The grandmother responded by telling them they could conduct their search, and they subsequently discovered the rifle, which was introduced as evidence during the trial.
However, at a hearing on a motion to suppress the evidence, the prosecutor stated that the search was justified based on the grandmother's consent, rather than the warrant. The defence argued that the search was illegal because the police falsely claimed they had a search warrant, leaving the grandmother with no choice but to consent.
The United States Supreme Court, in a 7-2 majority decision delivered by Justice Potter Stewart, ruled that the search was unlawful. The Court held that a search cannot be justified as lawful on the basis of consent when that consent has been given only after the officials conducting the search have asserted that they possess a warrant. In this case, the rifle, which was erroneously admitted into evidence, was damaging to the petitioner, and its admission was not harmless error.
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Missouri v. McNeely (2013)
In Missouri v. McNeely (2013), Tyler McNeely was stopped by a police officer at 2:08 a.m. for speeding and crossing the center line. The officer noticed signs of intoxication, including bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and the smell of alcohol on McNeely's breath. McNeely admitted to drinking alcohol and performed poorly on field sobriety tests. He refused to take a breathalyzer test and was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol.
Instead of taking McNeely to the police station, the officer took him to a nearby hospital for a blood alcohol test. The officer did not have a warrant but explained to McNeely that under Missouri's implied consent law, refusal to submit to the blood test would result in an immediate one-year suspension of his driver's license and could be used against him in future prosecutions. McNeely continued to refuse, but the officer proceeded with the blood test anyway, which showed a BAC above the legal limit.
McNeely challenged the blood test evidence, arguing that the officer should have obtained a search warrant before ordering the blood draw. The Missouri courts agreed, holding that the facts of the case did not establish sufficient exigent circumstances to exempt the officer from obtaining a warrant. The case was then appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Missouri Supreme Court's decision, ruling that police must generally obtain a warrant before subjecting a drunken-driving suspect to a blood test. The Court held that the nonconsensual warrantless blood draw violated McNeely's Fourth Amendment right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court found that McNeely's case was a routine drunk driving case and that the natural dissipation of blood alcohol did not establish an exigency that would justify a blood draw without consent or a warrant.
The Supreme Court's decision in Missouri v. McNeely (2013) set an important precedent for similar cases, clarifying that the natural metabolism of blood alcohol does not automatically justify a warrantless blood draw in drunk driving investigations. The case also highlighted the importance of obtaining voluntary consent and adhering to the Fourth Amendment, even in situations where implied consent laws may apply.
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Frequently asked questions
The case established that if one co-occupant of a residence consents to a search, and the other co-occupant expressly objects, the police cannot search the premises. However, if the objecting party is lawfully arrested and removed from the premises, the remaining co-occupant's consent is sufficient for the police to search.
The case established that a search cannot be justified as lawful on the basis of consent when that "consent" has been given only after the official conducting the search has (falsely) asserted that they possess a warrant.
The case established that a search is valid if the police reasonably believe that the consenting party has authority over the premises, even if this belief is incorrect.
The case established that consent to search is voluntary even if the individual is in custody and is not told they can refuse the search.
