Goldwater-Nichols: A Law That Transformed The Us Military

when did goldwater nichols become law

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was signed into law by President Ronald Reagan on October 1, 1986. The Act was named after Senator Barry Goldwater and Representative William Flynt Bill Nichols. It was designed to address issues of inter-service rivalry within the US military, which had become evident during the Vietnam War and the invasion of Grenada in 1983, among other events. The Goldwater-Nichols Act brought significant changes to the US military's organizational structure and chain of command.

Characteristics Values
Date of becoming law October 1, 1986
Bill name Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986
Bill number H.R.3622
Public law number 99-433
Sponsor Senator Barry Goldwater and Representative Bill Nichols
Purpose Improve the ability of U.S. armed forces to conduct joint and combined operations in the field, and improve the DoD budget process
Changes Strengthened the influence and staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) chairman; increased the authority and influence of the unified combatant commands; created a "joint officer specialization" within each service

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Goldwater-Nichols Act's impact on the chain of command

The Goldwater-Nichols Act, which became law on October 1, 1986, had a significant impact on the chain of command within the US military. The Act made sweeping changes to the US Department of Defense, addressing issues of inter-service rivalry that had plagued the military during the Vietnam War and the Iranian hostage rescue mission in 1980, and which were still evident during the invasion of Grenada in 1983.

Prior to the Act, the US military was organised along lines of command that reported to their respective service chiefs (Commandant of the Marine Corps, Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force, and Chief of Naval Operations). These service chiefs formed the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who elected a chairman to communicate with the civilian government. This system led to counter-productive rivalry, with peacetime and wartime activities planned, executed, and evaluated independently by each service branch.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act streamlined the military chain of command, which now runs directly from the President to the Secretary of Defense and then to the combatant commanders (all four-star generals or admirals). The service chiefs were reassigned to advisory roles, responsible for training and equipping personnel for the unified combatant commands. The Act also established the position of vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and clarified that the chairman and vice-chairman cannot be from the same service branch.

The Act centralised military advice in the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, designating them as the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. It increased the chairman's ability to direct overall strategy while providing greater command authority to "unified" and "specified" field commanders. The Act explicitly states that the chairman may not exercise military command over the Joint Chiefs of Staff or any of the armed forces.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act also changed the way different military services interact. The services themselves are responsible for organising, training, and equipping forces for use by the combatant commanders. The service chiefs no longer have operational control over their forces, and service component forces now support commanders responsible for specific functions or geographic regions. This restructuring promoted a combination of effort, integrated planning, shared procurement, and a reduction in inter-service rivalry, bringing the military in line with leading military science.

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Goldwater-Nichols Act's effect on military advice

The Goldwater-Nichols Act, which became law on October 1, 1986, had a significant impact on the provision of military advice, with several key changes.

Firstly, the Act centralised military advice in the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, rather than the service chiefs. This meant that the chairman became the principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. The Act also established the position of vice-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who could not be from the same service branch as the chairman. This change simplified the chain of command and increased the chairman's ability to direct overall strategy.

The Act also removed the service chiefs from the chain of command, which now ran directly from the President to the Secretary of Defense, and then to the regional and functional combatant commanders. The service chiefs were instead assigned an advisory role to the President and Secretary of Defense, with responsibility for training and equipping personnel for the unified combatant commands.

These changes were designed to address problems caused by inter-service rivalry, which had become evident during the Vietnam War, the Iranian hostage rescue mission in 1980, and the invasion of Grenada in 1983. The Goldwater-Nichols Act aimed to break down barriers between military services and enable a more "joint" total force, both during overseas operations and in the context of military planning and requirements processes.

Overall, the Goldwater-Nichols Act had a significant impact on the provision of military advice, centralising it in the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and simplifying the chain of command. These changes were intended to improve coordination and communication between different service branches and reduce inter-service rivalry.

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Goldwater-Nichols Act's influence on interaction of services

The Goldwater-Nichols Act, which became law on October 1, 1986, had a significant impact on the interaction of services within the US military. The Act addressed issues stemming from inter-service rivalry, which had become evident during the Vietnam War, the Iranian hostage rescue mission in 1980, and the invasion of Grenada in 1983.

Prior to the Act, the US military was organised along lines of command that reported to their respective service chiefs. These service chiefs constituted the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who elected a chairman to communicate with the civilian government and the secretary of defence. This structure led to counter-productive rivalry, with peacetime and wartime activities planned and executed independently by each service.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act changed the way the services interacted. The services themselves were now responsible for organising, training, and equipping forces for use by the combatant commanders. The service chiefs no longer had operational control over their forces. Instead, the service component forces supported the commander responsible for a specific function or geographic region. This restructuring resulted in a combination of efforts, integrated planning, shared procurement, and a reduction or elimination of inter-service rivalry.

The first successful test of the Act was the 1989 US invasion of Panama (Operation Just Cause), where Army General Maxwell Reid Thurman was able to exercise full control over Marine Corps, Army, Air Force, and Navy assets without negotiating with individual services.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act also had a significant impact on personnel management, with many officers being assigned to joint duty positions and educated in Joint Professional Military Education schools. This helped to ensure that officers had experience working across different services and improved interoperability between units and members of different services.

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Goldwater-Nichols Act's role in personnel management of officers

The Goldwater-Nichols Act, which became law on October 1, 1986, has had a significant impact on the personnel management of military officers. The Act established joint officer management policies, creating a "joint specialty" occupational category for officers trained in and oriented towards joint matters.

To be considered for this category, officers must complete a joint education program and a full joint duty tour. Half of the joint duty positions above captain/Navy lieutenant must be filled by officers who have been nominated or selected for the joint specialty. The Secretary of Defense is responsible for selecting these officers from nominees submitted by the Secretaries of the military departments. The Act also mandates that at least 1,000 critical joint duty assignments be filled by joint specialty officers, and establishes career guidelines for them.

Additionally, the Act requires that all officers promoted to general or flag rank attend a CAPSTONE education course on working with the other armed forces. Graduates of a joint school are immediately assigned to joint duty. The Act also sets out a promotion review process for officers serving in joint duty assignments, with certain qualification requirements to be met for specific promotion rates.

Furthermore, the Act prohibits promotion to general or flag rank unless the officer has served in a joint duty assignment, subject to a waiver by the Secretary. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff evaluates the joint duty performance of officers recommended for three and four-star ranks, and the Secretary advises the President on the qualifications needed for these positions.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act has brought about a significant shift in how military officers are managed, with many officers now being assigned to joint duty positions and receiving education in Department of Defense Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) schools as part of their career development. This has fostered greater interoperability and coordination among the different service branches.

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Goldwater-Nichols Act's implications for defense management and administration

The Goldwater-Nichols Act, signed into law by President Reagan on October 1, 1986, was the most sweeping change to the United States Department of Defense since the department was established in the National Security Act of 1947. The Act was named after Senator Barry Goldwater (R-Arizona) and Representative William Flynt "Bill" Nichols (D-Alabama). The Act re-worked the command structure of the U.S. military, increasing the powers of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and implementing suggestions from the Packard Commission. The Goldwater-Nichols Act streamlined the military chain of command, which now runs from the president through the secretary of defense directly to combatant commanders, bypassing the service chiefs. The service chiefs were assigned to an advisory role to the president and the secretary of defense, and given the responsibility for training and equipping personnel for the unified combatant commands.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act was an attempt to fix problems caused by inter-service rivalry, which had emerged during the Vietnam War, contributed to the catastrophic failure of the Iranian hostage rescue mission in 1980, and which were still evident in the invasion of Grenada in 1983. The Act also changed the way the services interact. The services themselves "organize, train and equip" forces for use by the combatant commanders, and the service chiefs no longer exercise any operational control over their forces. The Goldwater-Nichols Act dramatically changed the personnel management of military officers. Many officers are assigned to joint duty positions and are educated in Department of Defense Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) schools as part of their career development and progression.

Frequently asked questions

The Goldwater-Nichols Act, or the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, became law on October 1, 1986, when it was signed by President Ronald Reagan.

The Act made three major changes: it strengthened the position of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, increased the authority of the unified combatant commands, and created a "joint officer specialization" within each service to improve the quality of officers assigned to the Joint Staff.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act was enacted primarily to improve the ability of U.S. armed forces to conduct joint and combined operations in the field, and secondarily to improve the Department of Defense budget process. The Act was also intended to address problems caused by inter-service rivalry, which had contributed to the failure of the Iranian hostage rescue mission in 1980 and was evident in the invasion of Grenada in 1983.

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