The History Of Stop And Frisk Becoming Law

The legality of stop and frisk was established in 1968 following the US Supreme Court case Terry v. Ohio. The Court ruled that police could stop and frisk a citizen based on 'reasonable suspicion' that a crime had been committed, departing from the previous standard of 'probable cause'. The frisk aspect of the procedure is also called a Terry Stop, and it allows police to perform a quick pat-down of the suspect's outer clothing if they reasonably believe the individual is armed and dangerous.

The Terry Stop

The Terry Court held that a stop-and-frisk must comply with the Fourth Amendment, meaning that the stop-and-frisk cannot be unreasonable. A reasonable stop-and-frisk is one in which a reasonably prudent officer is warranted in the circumstances of a given case, believing that their safety or that of others is endangered. In this case, the officer may make a reasonable search for weapons on the person suspected of being armed and dangerous.

The Supreme Court's decision in Terry v. Ohio made suspicion of danger to an officer grounds for a "reasonable search". This means that a police officer with reasonable suspicion of a possible crime has the authority to stop and question an individual. If, based on the individual's answers, the suspicion does not escalate to probable cause for an arrest, the person should be released immediately.

The "frisk" part of the equation comes into play in two cases: if the possession of a weapon is suspected, or if reasonable suspicion of a possible crime escalates to probable cause for an arrest based on facts developed after the initial stop-and-question.

In the context of traffic stops, the Terry condition of a lawful investigatory stop is met when it is lawful for the police to detain an automobile and its occupants pending an inquiry into a vehicular violation. The police do not need to suspect that any occupant of the vehicle is involved in criminal activity. However, reasonable suspicion of criminal activities discovered during the traffic stop may give rise to a Terry stop.

It is important to note that the reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts and not just a gut feeling or hunch. The Supreme Court has ruled that a reasonable officer can make a legal investigative stop when they can articulate a reasonable suspicion that the person to be stopped is committing or has committed a crime.

In conclusion, the Terry Stop is a valuable tool for law enforcement officers to proactively combat crime in their communities. However, it is essential to ensure that the stop-and-frisk is conducted reasonably and within the boundaries set by the Fourth Amendment to protect the rights of individuals.

The Fourth Amendment

Stop-and-frisk, also known as a Terry Stop, is a brief and non-intrusive police stop of an individual. The Fourth Amendment requires that, before stopping a suspect, the police must have a reasonable suspicion that a crime has been, is being, or is about to be committed by the suspect. This is derived from the 1968 Supreme Court case, Terry v. Ohio, which ruled that police could stop and frisk a citizen based on 'reasonable suspicion' that a crime had been committed. The Court in Terry held that a stop-and-frisk must comply with the Fourth Amendment, meaning that the stop-and-frisk cannot be unreasonable. According to the Terry Court, a reasonable stop-and-frisk is one "in which a reasonably prudent officer is warranted in the circumstances of a given case in believing that his safety or that of others is endangered, he may make a reasonable search for weapons of the person believed by him to be armed and dangerous."

In the case of Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court granted limited approval for frisks conducted by officers lacking probable cause for an arrest in order to search for weapons if the officer suspects the subject to be armed and dangerous. The Court's decision made the suspicion of danger to an officer grounds for a "reasonable search". The Court set scope limitations for the stop-and-frisk, ruling that it cannot be a full-scale seizure of a person, it must be within reach, and it must last only a short time. Police officers can frisk a suspect only for what is absolutely necessary, such as looking for a weapon, and the search must be limited to a pat down of the exterior clothing of the suspect.

The police must have a flexible set of escalating responses, beginning with an articulable suspicion and extending to a reason to believe that the suspect is armed. If a frisk reveals that there is a weapon, then the police officer may arrest and search the suspect. This is based on more than whimsy but less than probable cause; it must be based on (1) reasonable suspicion, (2) good cause to believe, and (3) articulable suspicion.

In Rodriguez v. United States (2015), the Supreme Court held that a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for the stop violates the Constitution's shield against unreasonable seizures. A seizure justified only by a police-observed traffic violation becomes unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete the mission of issuing a ticket for the violation. In this case, a police dog performed a dog sniff search on the suspect after the officer had completed the Terry Stop. The Court held that the sniff search violated the Fourth Amendment as it was prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete the stop.

Racial profiling

The "stop and frisk" policy, also known as the Terry stop, was formalised in 1968 following the landmark Terry v. Ohio Supreme Court decision. The ruling held that if a law enforcement officer has "reasonable suspicion" that an individual has committed or is about to commit a crime, or is armed and dangerous, then stopping and searching that individual is constitutional.

In practice, the implementation of stop and frisk has been marred by accusations of racial profiling and discrimination. Research and data consistently show that the policy disproportionately targets people of colour, particularly Black and Latino individuals. For example, in New York City, where the policy has been widely used, 90% of those stopped in 2017 were African-American or Latino, while only 54.1% of the city's population in 2010 were from these ethnic groups.

The racial disparities in stop and frisk data have led to widespread criticism and accusations of racial profiling by the police. In 2012, several thousand people protested the policy by marching silently down Manhattan's Fifth Avenue. The New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU), along with other civil rights organisations, has been vocal in its opposition to the policy, arguing that it unfairly targets African-American and Hispanic-American individuals.

Despite the concerns raised, then-Mayor Michael Bloomberg defended the policy, claiming that it was based on the descriptions of suspects provided by witnesses and victims, rather than racial profiling. However, the data suggests otherwise, indicating a clear overrepresentation of people of colour, especially Blacks and Latinos, among those stopped and frisked.

The controversy surrounding stop and frisk culminated in a federal judge ruling in 2013 that the New York City Police Department's (NYPD) policy was unconstitutional, violating the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. This ruling directed the NYPD to adopt a written policy specifying where such stops are authorised and led to a significant reduction in the number of stops conducted.

While the number of stop and frisk incidents has decreased in recent years, the practice continues to be a source of concern for civil rights advocates and communities of colour, who argue that it perpetuates a system of racial discrimination and harassment.

Reasonable suspicion

The "stop and frisk" rule in the United States originated from the Fourth Amendment, which protects citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Supreme Court's 1968 ruling in Terry v. Ohio established that police officers could stop and frisk individuals based on 'reasonable suspicion' that a crime had been, was being, or was about to be committed. This marked a departure from the previous standard of 'probable cause'.

The Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio set out the parameters for a reasonable stop-and-frisk. Firstly, it must be brief and non-intrusive. Secondly, the officer must have a reasonable suspicion that a crime has been, is being, or is about to be committed by the suspect. Thirdly, if the officer reasonably believes the individual is armed and dangerous, they may conduct a quick pat-down of the suspect's outer clothing. This frisk is justified by the officer's concern for their safety or the safety of others.

The Court emphasised that a stop-and-frisk must comply with the Fourth Amendment and cannot be unreasonable. A stop becomes unlawful if it exceeds the time needed to address the issue that warranted the stop in the first place. For instance, in Rodriguez v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled that a police dog performing a sniff search after the officer had completed their Terry Stop violated the Fourth Amendment as it prolonged the stop beyond what was reasonably required.

In practice, reasonable suspicion has been applied in various scenarios. Police officers are justified in stopping individuals if they match the description of a wanted suspect, are present near a crime scene, are in a high-crime area exhibiting concerning behaviours, are running away or displaying furtive movements, or are loitering or looking for something. Additionally, acting strangely, such as displaying anger, fear, or excessive emotion, or being out of place for the area or time of day, can also prompt a stop.

The "reasonable suspicion" standard set by Terry v. Ohio has had a significant impact on policing practices and has been adopted by all 50 states in some form. However, it has also been the subject of controversy, particularly regarding racial profiling and the potential for misuse.

Unconstitutionality

The practice of stop and frisk is not unconstitutional. However, in 2013, US District Court Judge Shira Scheindlin ruled that the New York Police Department's stop-and-frisk program was carried out in a manner that violated the US Constitution. The court found the NYPD guilty of violating the Fourth Amendment, which protects citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures, and the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits racially discriminatory policing.

In the 1968 case of Terry v. Ohio, the US Supreme Court ruled that police could stop and frisk a citizen based on 'reasonable suspicion' that a crime had been committed. This set a precedent for stop-and-frisk practices across the country. However, the court also held that a stop-and-frisk must comply with the Fourth Amendment, meaning that it cannot be unreasonable. According to the Terry Court, a reasonable stop-and-frisk is one "in which a reasonably prudent officer is warranted in the circumstances of a given case in believing that his safety or that of others is endangered".

In the case of Floyd v. City of New York, Judge Scheindlin found that the NYPD's stop-and-frisk practices were unconstitutional and racially discriminatory. She wrote that the NYPD had an "unwritten policy of targeting 'the right people' for stops", which resulted in the targeting of young Black and Hispanic men based on their prevalence in local crime complaints. This, she argued, was a form of racial profiling.

The court ordered a series of reforms to the NYPD's policing practices, including the appointment of a court-appointed monitor and a Joint Remedial Process that would solicit input from affected New York communities. The court's ruling was the result of a 10-week trial and a class-action lawsuit brought by the Center for Constitutional Rights and several law firms.

While the practice of stop and frisk itself is not unconstitutional, the way it was carried out by the NYPD was found to be so. This ruling sent a strong message that racial profiling and discriminatory policing practices are unconstitutional and will not be tolerated.

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