Pennsylvania Election Law: Broken Or Not?

Pennsylvania's Election Code, which governs when, where, and how elections are run in the state, is outdated and has not been comprehensively updated since 1937. The code contains conflicting sections, provisions that don't address legal precedents, and language that doesn't reflect how elections are run today. This has led to confusion, lawsuits, and misinformation. The code also doesn't incorporate modern technology or new legal precedents, which has made the job of running elections harder for county officials. With the 2024 presidential election approaching, old rules are likely to remain, and important new precedents will be absent, which could contribute to electoral chaos and disenfranchise voters.

Counting mail-in ballots

The process of counting mail-in ballots varies across different states. In most states, officials cannot feed mail-in ballots into the tabulator until the polls close on Election Day. However, there are differences in when states can begin processing and counting these ballots. For instance, in seven states, including Pennsylvania, mailed-in ballots can be processed on Election Day before the polls close. In contrast, 23 states mandate that the counting of mail-in ballots begins on Election Day but before the polls close.

The counting of mail-in ballots typically involves several steps: checking the ballot envelope, verifying that the signature on the return envelope matches the voter's signature, opening the envelope, and preparing the ballot for counting. This process can be time-consuming and resource-intensive, especially when there is a large volume of mail-in ballots.

In California, county elections officials are required to begin reporting results to the Secretary of State no more than two hours after they start tallying votes after the polls close. These initial results typically include ballots received before Election Day, such as mail-in ballots and early voting location ballots. County officials can start opening and processing mail-in ballot envelopes up to 29 days before Election Day, but these results cannot be shared with the public until all polls close on Election Day.

The complete tally of votes is rarely finished on Election Night, as mail-in ballots received within a certain timeframe after Election Day must still be counted. These ballots are counted during the official canvass period, which in California, is 30 days after Election Day. During this period, county elections officials will process and count mail-in ballots received within seven days of the election, conduct a required post-election audit, and verify signatures on envelopes.

Absentee ballots

The process for handling absentee ballots is as follows:

• Bipartisan teams open the outside return envelope and set it aside so it cannot be linked to the ballot.
• The secrecy envelope is checked for any writing that would identify the voter. Envelopes with identifying marks are set aside.
• Secrecy envelopes without identifying marks are opened, and the ballot is removed.
• The secrecy envelope is set aside, and the ballot is unfolded and flattened to be read by the scanners.
• The ballot is scanned through high-speed scanners to record each vote.
• Results are uploaded to the county website and the Department of State after the polls close.

Voter fraud

One prominent case involved Jennifer Hill, a woman from Chester, Pennsylvania, who was charged with felony forgery, public records tampering, and voter registration-related charges. Hill was accused of attempting to register dead people, including her father, to vote in the 2024 election. She allegedly used an app provided by the Pennsylvania Department of State for legal voter registration drives to carry out this scheme. As a result of her actions, Hill faces multiple counts of forgery and voter registration-related charges.

In another instance, an 84-year-old man named Philip Moss was charged with voting in two different states, casting his ballot in Florida and by mail in Delaware County, Pennsylvania. This case highlights the complexity of voter fraud and the challenges faced by election officials in ensuring the integrity of the voting process.

The Pennsylvania Department of State takes election fraud and voting irregularities seriously. They encourage individuals to report any suspected instances of voter fraud or unfair behaviour while voting. The Department provides an online form and a hotline for individuals to file election complaints. It is important to note that individuals must be registered to vote in Pennsylvania and have their information match their voter registration record to file a complaint.

The impact of voter fraud can be profound, as seen in the case of Georgia election worker Shaye Moss. Moss and her mother, Ruby Freeman, were falsely accused of manipulating ballots by former New York City Mayor and Trump attorney Rudy Giuliani. As a result of the baseless allegations, Moss and Freeman faced harassment and threats, and their lives were significantly impacted. A jury found Giuliani liable for defamation, and they were awarded $148 million in damages.

Overall, voter fraud is a critical issue that requires attention and action. While there have been instances of voter fraud in Pennsylvania, it is important to rely on official sources and fact-checking organizations to verify claims and ensure the accuracy of information. By staying informed and vigilant, individuals can play a crucial role in upholding the integrity of elections and preventing voter fraud.

Signature requirements

Pennsylvania's Election Code, which governs when, where, and how elections are run in the state, is outdated and has not been comprehensively updated since 1937. This has resulted in conflicting sections, provisions that do not address current legal precedents, and language that does not reflect modern election practices and technologies.

One example of a conflict within the Election Code relates to the acceptance of provisional ballots. Act 77, a 2019 law that expanded no-excuse mail voting and eliminated straight-ticket voting, states that if a voter has returned a mail ballot to their county election office on time, they cannot also cast a provisional ballot. However, an older section of the Election Code states that provisional ballots are only barred once a mail ballot is "cast," which has been interpreted to mean once a ballot has been opened and scanned. This conflict has led to confusion and lawsuits, with a judge ruling that Delaware County should accept in-person votes from residents whose mail ballots were rejected.

Another issue with Pennsylvania's Election Code is that it does not address key legal precedents, such as the 2000 Commonwealth Court case, Mixon v. Commonwealth, which ruled that a provision prohibiting people convicted of felonies from voting for five years after their release was unconstitutional. Despite this ruling, the provision has not been removed from the code, leading to confusion and potential disenfranchisement of voters.

The code also includes archaic rules that are no longer relevant, such as the requirement for lanterns or proper substitutes in polling places, which dates back to 1937 when electric lights were not widely available. While many of these outdated provisions are simply ignored, they can still cause confusion and be exploited by election deniers to spread misinformation.

The lack of regular updates to the Election Code has resulted in a patchwork of disparate voting practices across the state, making it harder for some voters to cast their ballots than others. County election directors have to rely on sources outside of the code, including legal opinions, advice from county solicitors, and other administrators to navigate the election procedures. This inconsistency in election practices across counties can lead to electoral chaos, voter disenfranchisement, and costly lawsuits.

To address these issues, some have suggested an alternative to a comprehensive Election Code update, such as a state manual or comprehensive training for election directors to promote more uniform practices. However, as of 2024, Pennsylvania's Election Code remains outdated and in need of significant revisions to ensure smooth and fair elections in the future.

Voting machine security

One of the most common misconceptions is that voting machines are hacked when an election doesn't go the way people expect or want. However, for a machine to be hacked, it must be connected to the internet. In Macoupin County, Illinois, for example, voting machines are never connected to the internet at any time. Voters use a touchscreen to cast their vote and print out a paper ballot, which is then inserted into a tabulator to be counted, again, a machine that is never connected to the internet. After the polls close, the tabulator and paper ballots are returned to the Courthouse, and the results are uploaded to a laptop that has never been and will never be connected to the internet. The only step in the process that could potentially be hacked is when the results are uploaded to a public website, but even if this were to happen, the official results on the laptop and the paper ballots would remain unchanged.

To address ongoing security concerns, Congress has been working to put stricter cybersecurity measures in place for US election technology. The Intelligence Authorization Act, which funds intelligence agencies, includes the Strengthening Election Cybersecurity to Uphold Respect for Elections through Independent Testing (SECURE IT) Act. This act would require penetration testing of federally certified voting machines and ballot scanners and create a pilot program to explore the feasibility of independent researchers testing all manner of election systems for flaws. The act could significantly improve the security of election technology and expose vulnerabilities by attempting to penetrate systems using the same tools and methods used by malicious actors.

The SECURE IT Act also addresses the concerns of election vendors and researchers, who have clashed over how to examine and disclose flaws in voting systems. The act requires the US Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to vet prospective testers and prohibits them from publicly disclosing any vulnerabilities for 180 days. During this time, they must report any issues to the EAC and the Department of Homeland Security.

Frequently asked questions