The Coker standard refers to the US Supreme Court's decision in Coker v. Georgia, which held that the death penalty for the rape of an adult was grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment, and therefore unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. This case established a precedent regarding the proportionality of punishment and the evolving standards of decency in American society. The Court's ruling was based on several factors, including the nature of the crime, societal values, legislative history, and the role of juries in sentencing. The Court's decision reflected a shift in societal attitudes toward the death penalty for rape and reinforced the principle that punishments must be commensurate with the severity of the crime.
Characteristics | Values |
---|---|
Date of Decision | June 29, 1977 |
Case Name | Coker v. Georgia |
Citation | 433 U.S. 584 (1977) |
Holding | The death penalty for rape of an adult is grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment, and therefore unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. |
Majority Opinion | Justice White |
Concurring Opinions | Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, Justice Powell |
Dissenting Opinions | Chief Justice Burger, Justice Rehnquist |
Petitioner | Ehrlich Anthony Coker |
Petitioner's Crime | Rape, armed robbery, kidnapping, aggravated assault, escape |
Victim | Elnita Carver |
State Statute | Ga.Code Ann. § 26-2001 (1972) |
What You'll Learn
- The death penalty for rape is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment
- The death penalty is disproportionate and excessive punishment for rape
- The death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment for rape
- The death penalty for rape is grossly disproportionate and excessive
- The death penalty for rape is forbidden by the Eighth Amendment
The death penalty for rape is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment
The Coker Standard refers to the 1977 US Supreme Court decision in Coker v. Georgia, which held that the death penalty for the rape of an adult was "grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment, and therefore unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment to the US Constitution. This set a precedent that the death penalty was not permissible for rape and established the conditions under which the death penalty could be considered cruel and unusual punishment and thus a violation of the Eighth Amendment.
The Eighth Amendment of the US Constitution provides several important protections for people convicted of a crime. The most well-known part of the amendment is the protection against "cruel and unusual punishments." Over the years, the Supreme Court has decided whether the Eighth Amendment bars or limits the use of the death penalty, and under what circumstances.
The Supreme Court has held that a death sentence is not inherently cruel and unusual. However, they have concluded that laws making the death penalty mandatory with no discretion are cruel and unusual. The Court has identified certain types of cases where the death penalty rises to the level of cruel and unusual punishment, such as executing defendants who are mentally disabled.
The Eighth Amendment also protects against excessive bail, which must not be set at an unreasonably high amount, and excessive fines, which should be proportional to the offense committed and the individual's financial means.
In Coker v. Georgia, the Court examined whether the death penalty for rape violated the Eighth Amendment. The Court's decision established that the Eighth Amendment bars not only punishments that are "barbaric" but also those that are "excessive" in relation to the crime committed. A punishment is considered "excessive" and unconstitutional if it meets one of the following criteria:
- It makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and is thus the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering.
- It is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.
The Court found that the death penalty for rape met the second criterion and was therefore unconstitutional. They reasoned that death was a disproportionate penalty for rape, as evidenced by the fact that Georgia was the only state at the time that authorized the death sentence for rape of an adult woman. The Court acknowledged the seriousness of rape as a crime but concluded that it did not compare to murder in terms of moral depravity and injury to the victim and the public.
The Coker decision, along with Gregg v. Georgia (1976), established the conditions under which the death penalty is considered cruel and unusual punishment and thus a violation of the Eighth Amendment. These cases set a precedent that the death penalty is not permissible for rape and that capital punishment is only permissible for the crime of deliberate murder.
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The death penalty is disproportionate and excessive punishment for rape
The Coker Standard refers to the precedent set by the 1977 US Supreme Court case Coker v. Georgia, which ruled that the death penalty for the rape of an adult is a disproportionate and excessive punishment, and therefore, a violation of the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. This case established the principle that a punishment must be proportional to the crime committed and reflected a shift in societal attitudes towards capital punishment for rape.
The Death Penalty as Disproportionate and Excessive Punishment for Rape
The death penalty is a disproportionate and excessive punishment for rape and thus, unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. This conclusion is supported by several key considerations:
Proportionality of Punishment
Rape, while a serious and violent crime, does not involve the taking of life. The death penalty, with its severity and finality, is excessive when compared to the consequences of rape. This distinction between rape and crimes involving homicide is crucial in assessing the appropriateness of capital punishment. While life may be irrevocably lost for the victim of murder, life for the rape victim continues, even if it may not be the same as before. This reflects a judgment that the irreversible nature of the death penalty is disproportionate to the harm caused by rape.
Evolving Standards of Decency
Societal attitudes towards the death penalty for rape have shifted significantly. At the time of the Coker decision, only three states had statutes authorizing the death penalty for the rape of an adult woman, indicating a societal move away from viewing capital punishment as an acceptable response to rape. This change reflects a broader consensus that the death penalty for rape is unnecessarily harsh.
Historical and Legislative Context
There has been a continuous decline in the number of states permitting the death penalty for rape, particularly following the Furman v. Georgia decision in 1972. The legislative abolition of the death penalty for rape in many states post-Furman further demonstrates that it is regarded as an inappropriate and excessive response.
Jury's Discretion and Sentencing Trends
Juries, even when given the legal option to impose the death penalty for rape, often chose not to do so. This demonstrates that, on a practical level, even those with the legal power to apply the death penalty for rape tend to opt for less severe punishments. The reluctance of juries to impose the death penalty for rape is seen as a "significant and reliable objective index of contemporary values."
Comparative Analysis
If the death penalty is considered excessive for crimes that involve unintentional killing, it is surely excessive for rape, which does not involve death. This comparative severity reinforces the conclusion that the death penalty is disproportionate for rape.
International Perspective
Among a broad survey of nations, very few retained the death penalty for rape. This international perspective supports the view that there is a global consensus against the death penalty for crimes like rape that do not result in death.
Together, these factors led the Court to conclude that the death penalty for the rape of an adult is "grossly disproportionate" and "excessive," and thus, unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. This decision reflects a judicial acknowledgment of changing societal standards, the importance of proportionality in punishment, and a commitment to aligning legal outcomes with contemporary moral values and international norms.
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The death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment for rape
The Coker standard refers to the 1977 case of Coker v. Georgia, in which the US Supreme Court ruled that the death penalty for the rape of an adult was "grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment, and therefore unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution." This set a precedent that the death penalty was unconstitutional for rape cases where there was no intention to kill.
The case concerned Ehrlich Anthony Coker, who was serving several sentences for rape, kidnapping, one count of first-degree murder, and aggravated assault. Coker escaped from prison and broke into the home of Allen and Elnita Carver, whom he robbed at knifepoint, before raping 16-year-old Elnita in front of her husband. Coker was convicted of rape, armed robbery, and other offenses, and sentenced to death for the rape charge. The Supreme Court of Georgia upheld the death sentence.
However, the US Supreme Court Justices White, Stewart, Blackmun, and Stevens concluded that the death sentence for the crime of rape was "grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment, and [...] forbidden by the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment." Justice White wrote that the death penalty was a disproportionate punishment for rape as it was "unique in its severity and irrevocability." He noted that rape was a serious crime that could inflict mental and psychological damage on the victim and undermine the community's sense of security, but distinguished it from murder, writing:
> Life is over for the victim of the murderer; for the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it was, but it is not over and normally is not beyond repair.
Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred with the judgment, as it struck down a death penalty, which aligned with their view that the death penalty is per se cruel and unusual punishment.
Justice Powell also concurred with the judgment but emphasized that the death penalty may be appropriate for rape if there are aggravating circumstances. He believed the plurality opinion was "so sweeping as to foreclose each of the 50 state legislatures from creating a narrowly defined crime of aggravated rape."
Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented, believing that the proportionality principle the Court had applied to the Eighth Amendment encroached too much on the legislative power of the states. Burger argued that the Eighth Amendment did not prevent the state from taking an individual's "well-demonstrated propensity for life-endangering behavior" into account when devising punitive measures. He also disagreed with the Court's assessment of the retribution and deterrence value of the death penalty for rape, believing it might deter prospective rapists and increase the general feeling of security among community members.
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The death penalty for rape is grossly disproportionate and excessive
The Coker standard is derived from the case of Coker v. Georgia, where the Supreme Court held that the death penalty for the rape of an adult was grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment, and therefore unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. The Court's decision was informed by several considerations, including evolving standards of decency, the proportionality of punishment, legislative context, jury discretion, and comparative analysis with other crimes.
Evolving Standards of Decency
At the time of the Coker decision, only three states had statutes that authorized the death penalty for the rape of an adult woman, reflecting a societal move away from viewing capital punishment as an acceptable consequence for rape. This shift in societal and legislative judgment against the death penalty for rape was a critical factor in the Court's analysis.
Proportionality of Punishment
The Court's reasoning heavily centered on the principle of proportionality, which requires that a punishment be commensurate with the crime's severity. The Court argued that the death penalty is an excessive response to rape because rape, while serious and violent, does not involve the taking of life. The irreversible nature of the death penalty is thus disproportionate to the consequences of rape. The Court drew a clear distinction between rape and crimes involving homicide, stating, "Life is over for the victim of the murderer; for the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it was, but it is not over and normally is not beyond repair."
Legislative Context
The Court reviewed the historical context and legislative history concerning the death penalty for rape, noting a continuous and sharp decline in the number of states permitting this punishment. This decline was part of a broader reassessment of the death penalty for non-homicidal offenses following the Furman v. Georgia decision in 1972. The legislative abolition of the death penalty for rape in many states post-Furman was seen as evidence that society regarded capital punishment as an inappropriate and excessive response to rape.
Jury Discretion and Sentencing Trends
The Court also considered the role of juries in imposing the death penalty. It was noted that in cases of rape where the death penalty could be applied, juries often chose not to impose it. This demonstrated that even among those given the legal option, there was a clear tendency to opt for less severe punishments. The Court viewed this as a "significant and reliable objective index of contemporary values," suggesting that society did not support such severe punishment for rape.
Comparative Analysis with Other Crimes
The Court argued that if the death penalty is considered excessive for crimes that involve unintentional killing, it is surely excessive for rape, which does not involve death. This comparative severity played a crucial role in determining that the death penalty was disproportionate for rape.
In conclusion, the Court's decision in Coker v. Georgia reflects a judicial acknowledgment of changing societal standards, the importance of proportionality in punishment, and a commitment to aligning legal outcomes with contemporary moral values. The Court held that the death penalty for the rape of an adult is "grossly disproportionate" and "excessive," and thus, unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.
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The death penalty for rape is forbidden by the Eighth Amendment
The Coker Standard is a precedent set by the 1977 case of Coker v. Georgia, which ruled that the death penalty for rape is forbidden by the Eighth Amendment. The case established that the death penalty was an "`excessive' punishment for rape and was therefore "`grossly disproportionate` and `unconstitutional".
The Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects against "cruel and unusual punishments". In Coker v. Georgia, the Supreme Court held that the death penalty for rape was forbidden by the Eighth Amendment, as it was "grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment". The Court's judgment was informed by "objective factors", including state laws and jury sentencing behaviour.
The case of Coker v. Georgia involved Ehrlich Anthony Coker, who was serving several sentences for rape, kidnapping, murder, and aggravated assault. Coker escaped from prison and raped a 16-year-old girl in front of her husband. He was convicted of rape, armed robbery, and other offences, and was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of Georgia upheld the death sentence.
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the judgment, holding that the death sentence was an unconstitutional punishment for rape. The Court's decision was based on the "evolving standards of decency" and "objective evidence" of societal mores and attitudes towards rape and its punishment. The Court noted that Georgia was the only state at the time that authorised the death sentence for rape, and that in the vast majority of rape convictions in Georgia, juries had not imposed the death sentence.
The Court acknowledged the seriousness of rape as a crime, but distinguished it from murder, stating that "life is over for the victim of the murderer; for the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it was, but it is not over and normally is not beyond repair". The Court held that the death penalty was an "excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such, does not take human life".
The Coker Standard, therefore, sets a precedent that the death penalty for rape is forbidden by the Eighth Amendment as it is a "grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment". The case highlights the role of the Supreme Court in interpreting the Eighth Amendment and its prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishments". The Court's decision in Coker v. Georgia was informed by societal attitudes and state laws, demonstrating the dynamic nature of constitutional interpretation.
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Frequently asked questions
The Coker Standard refers to the US Supreme Court's decision in Coker v. Georgia (1977) that the death penalty for the rape of an adult is grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment, and therefore unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.
Ehrlich Anthony Coker committed a series of crimes, including rape, kidnapping, and murder, and was serving various sentences when he escaped from a Georgia prison. During his escape, he entered the home of Allen and Elnita Carver, robbed them, and raped Mrs Carver. He was convicted of rape and other offenses and sentenced to death on the rape charge.
The Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of rape violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.
The Court's reasoning centered on the principle of proportionality, the evolving standards of decency, the historical and legislative context, the jury's discretion, and a comparative analysis with other crimes. The Court concluded that the death penalty was a disproportionate and excessive punishment for rape as it did not involve the taking of life.
Justice Powell concurred with the majority's judgment that the death penalty was disproportionate in Coker's case but disagreed with the broad application of the decision to all instances of rape. He argued that state legislatures should have the discretion to define and legislate against aggravated rape, potentially warranting the death penalty under specific conditions.
Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented, expressing concern that the majority had overstepped its constitutional boundaries and substituted its judgment for that of the state legislature. He argued that the death penalty was not disproportionate for the crime of rape, especially given Coker's history of violent crimes, and that the Court's decision undermined public safety by removing a deterrent for rapists.