Congress Law: Can It Be Refused?

The US Congress is subject to the US Constitution and does not have absolute power to compel answers. Congress can be refused in some cases, such as when the 5th Amendment protects witnesses. The President can also refuse to spend funds approved by Congress, as demonstrated by President Richard Nixon in the 1970s.

Refusal to answer questions in a Congressional hearing

The US Congress is subject to the US Constitution, unlike Australian parliaments, which are generally above the law. The 5th Amendment protects witnesses in some ways, and Congress cannot compel answers.

There is no clear statute surrounding refusal to answer questions in a Congressional hearing. However, the committee can take action, and the outcome of this process does not hinge on the fact that a question was asked and the witness refused to answer.

In terms of spending, the Constitution’s Article I, Section 9 grants Congress the power of the purse to approve spending in the federal budget in the Appropriations Clause. The Constitution then delegates to the president the task of spending approved funds in the Take Care Clause, which requires the chief executive to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.

The Line Item Veto Act of 1996 was an effort to give the president more flexibility in controlling how funds allocated by Congress are spent. The act amended the ICA to authorise the president to cancel any dollar amount of discretionary budget authority, any item of new direct spending, or any limited tax benefit signed into law. Congress could override a spending cancellation by the president using an expedited process.

US Congress is subject to the US Constitution

The US Congress is subject to the US Constitution. In the case of Kilboum v Thompson (1881), it was established that the US Congress is subject to the US Constitution. This means that the US Congress cannot be above the law.

The US Constitution's Article I, Section 9 grants Congress the power to approve spending in the federal budget in the Appropriations Clause. This clause states that "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law". The Constitution also delegates to the President the task of spending approved funds in the Take Care Clause, which requires the President to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed".

An example of a conflict over spending took place in the 1970s when President Richard Nixon refused to spend funds on numerous programs approved by Congress. Another example is the Line Item Veto Act of 1996, which amended the ICA to give the President more flexibility in controlling how funds allocated by Congress are spent. The Act allowed the President to cancel any dollar amount of discretionary budget authority, any item of new direct spending, or any limited tax benefit signed into law, as long as certain conditions were met, including reducing the federal budget deficit and not impairing "essential Government functions" or causing "harm" to "the national interest". Congress could override a spending cancellation by the President using an expedited process.

Congress does not have absolute power to compel answers. For example, the 5th Amendment protects witnesses in some ways, and Congress cannot compel answers in those cases.

Contempt of Congress

Congress is subject to the US Constitution, and the US Constitution grants Congress the power of the purse to approve spending in the federal budget. The president is then tasked with spending the approved funds.

In the 1970s, President Richard Nixon refused to spend funds on numerous programs approved by Congress. This was an example of a conflict over impoundment.

Congress does not have absolute power to compel answers. For example, the 5th Amendment protects witnesses in some ways.

Congress can override a spending cancellation by the president using an expedited process.

The President can refuse to spend funds approved by Congress

The most notable example of a conflict over impoundment took place in the 1970s, when President Richard Nixon refused to spend funds on numerous programs approved by Congress. Another effort to give the President more flexibility in controlling how funds allocated by Congress are spent was the Line Item Veto Act of 1996. The act amended the ICA "to authorise the President to cancel in whole any dollar amount of discretionary budget authority, any item of new direct spending, or any limited tax benefit signed into law." Such moves required certain conditions, including reducing the federal budget deficit and not impairing "essential Government functions" or causing "harm" to "the national interest." Congress could override a spending cancellation by the President using an expedited process. President Bill Clinton used the line-item veto 82 times during its brief existence, with Congress restoring 39 appropriations.

Congress can override a spending cancellation by the President

The Impoundment Control Act of 1974 requires the president to report to Congress when he impounds funds as a deferment (a temporary delay) or a recission (a permanent cancellation) of spending. Under the ICA, spending deferrals must not extend beyond the current fiscal year, and Congress can override deferrals using an expedited process. For recissions, the president must propose such actions to Congress for approval, and he can delay spending-related to recissions for 45 days.

The Line Item Veto Act of 1996 amended the ICA to authorise the President to cancel any dollar amount of discretionary budget authority, any item of new direct spending, or any limited tax benefit signed into law. Such moves required certain conditions, including reducing the federal budget deficit and not impairing “essential Government functions” or causing “harm” to “the national interest”. Congress could override a spending cancellation by the president using an expedited process. President Bill Clinton used the line-item veto 82 times during its brief existence, with Congress restoring 39 appropriations.

Frequently asked questions