Prism's Unlawful Actions: Breaking Laws, Shattering Trust

In June 2013, a leak by a private contractor working for Booz Allen Hamilton revealed the existence of PRISM, a mechanism that allows the US government to collect user data from major tech companies like Google, Microsoft, and Apple. This revelation sparked widespread debate about the legality and ethical implications of government surveillance programs. PRISM has been authorised as part of foreign intelligence gathering under the 2008 Amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). However, critics argue that it violates the constitutional rights of US citizens, particularly the Fourth Amendment, which protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. The program's broad scope and lack of oversight have raised concerns about the protection of civil liberties and privacy rights.

PRISM violates the Fourth Amendment by enabling the state to indiscriminately capture data

The Fourth Amendment protects the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. It also states that no warrants shall be issued without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

The PRISM program, run by the National Security Agency (NSA), has been criticised for violating the Fourth Amendment by enabling the state to indiscriminately capture data. Under PRISM, the NSA, FBI, and CIA gather and search through Americans' international emails, internet calls, and chats without obtaining a warrant. This includes accessing user audio and video chats, photographs, emails, documents, and connection logs from nine internet companies: Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, Apple, Facebook, Skype, YouTube, AOL, and Paltalk.

While the government insists that PRISM is targeted at foreigners who lack Fourth Amendment privacy rights, it has been revealed that the program systematically combs through its databases for the emails and messages of Americans. FBI agents are able to search for the communications of specific Americans using their names or email addresses, including at the earliest stages of domestic criminal investigations. This has been described as an "end-run" around the Fourth Amendment, as investigators have easy access to a trove of private information without ever seeking approval from a judge.

The ACLU has filed a lawsuit arguing that PRISM violates the Fourth Amendment's protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. The lawsuit claims that the government's acquisition of telephone records is akin to snatching every American's address book and is not authorised by Section 215 of the Patriot Act. Yahoo has also previously challenged the constitutionality of PRISM, arguing that even if the program's main goal is to focus on foreign communications, the incidental collection of American data violates the "warrant clause" and "unreasonable searches clause" of the Fourth Amendment.

The FISA Amendments Act permits the government to monitor millions of people

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) was introduced in 1977 and signed into law by President Jimmy Carter in 1978. The Act established procedures for the surveillance and collection of foreign intelligence on domestic soil. FISA was enacted in response to widespread privacy violations by the federal government under President Richard Nixon.

In 2008, the FISA Amendments Act (FISAAA) was passed. This Act permits the government to obtain a single court order to monitor thousands, or even millions, of people. The FISAAA removed the requirement for the government to show probable cause that the target is an agent of a foreign power. Instead, the government need only have a "reasonable belief" that the target is located outside of the United States.

The FISAAA also does not require the government to identify its targets or the facilities being monitored. The purpose of foreign intelligence gathering is attached to the whole surveillance program, rather than individual investigations. This means that the government can obtain a single court order to monitor a vast number of people.

The FISAAA has been criticised for its lack of oversight and for sweeping in untold numbers of Americans who communicate with foreigners. The Act has also been criticised for inevitably sweeping in purely domestic communications, as the government need only have a "reasonable belief" that the target is outside the United States.

The FISA Amendments Act does not require the government to identify its targets

The FISA Amendments Act (FISAAA) does not require the government to identify its targets. The Act permits the government to obtain a single court order to monitor thousands, or even millions, of people. This has vastly expanded the scope of "incidental" surveillance as Congress has lowered the requirements for spying on primary targets.

The Act allows the Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence to jointly authorise, for periods of up to one year, the targeting of electronic surveillance of persons located outside the US to acquire foreign intelligence information. However, the Act does not require the government to identify these targets by name or location. The purpose of foreign intelligence gathering is attached to the whole surveillance program, rather than individual investigations.

The FISAAA also does not require the government to identify the monitored facilities. This means that the government can access user data from companies like Microsoft, Google, Apple, Yahoo, and others without disclosing which facilities are being monitored.

The lack of specific targets or places in the FISAAA has been criticised for granting the government broad authority to conduct surveillance with minimal court and congressional oversight. This has raised concerns about the extent of the program and whether it violates the constitutional rights of US citizens.

The FISA Court does not provide adequate oversight

I am unable to perform a search using the query "how tdoes prism break the law". However, here is a response to "The FISA Court does not provide adequate oversight" based on my existing knowledge:

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Court, which is tasked with overseeing the US government's surveillance programs, has been criticised for failing to provide adequate oversight and for being too deferential to the government. The court operates in secret, with only the government's arguments being heard, and has been accused of rubber-stamping surveillance requests with little to no scrutiny. This lack of transparency and accountability raises serious concerns about the court's ability to effectively oversee the government's surveillance activities and protect the privacy and civil liberties of US citizens.

One of the main issues with the FISA Court is its lack of adversarial process. Unlike a typical court proceeding, where both sides of a case are presented and argued, the FISA Court only hears arguments from the government. This means that there is no one representing the interests of the target of the surveillance or the public at large. As a result, the court often relies solely on the government's interpretation of the law and facts of the case, without any independent verification or challenge.

Another concern is the lack of transparency surrounding the FISA Court's proceedings and decisions. The court's opinions and orders are typically classified, and even the existence of a particular case may be unknown to the public. While some information has been declassified and released in response to public pressure and lawsuits, much of the court's work remains shrouded in secrecy. This lack of transparency makes it difficult for the public to understand how the court interprets the law and exercises its authority, and hampers efforts to hold the court accountable.

The FISA Court has also been criticised for its broad interpretation of the law and its approval of sweeping surveillance programs. For example, the court's interpretation of the "relevance" standard for collecting information under Section 702 of FISA has been called overly broad, allowing the government to collect vast amounts of data on individuals with tenuous connections to foreign intelligence targets. The court has also approved programs involving the bulk collection of data, such as phone records and email metadata, raising concerns about the scope and invasiveness of surveillance.

Finally, the FISA Court lacks meaningful consequences for non-compliance or abuse. While the court can reject or modify surveillance applications, it rarely does so, and there have been no reported cases of sanctions for providing misleading information. This lack of enforcement undermines the court's ability to deter abuses and ensure compliance.

In summary, the FISA Court's lack of transparency, accountability, and adversarial process raises significant concerns about its ability to provide adequate oversight of the government's surveillance activities. Without reforms to address these issues, the court may continue to fall short of its crucial role in protecting the privacy and civil liberties of US citizens.

The FISA Amendments Act permits the government to obtain a single court order to monitor thousands of people

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) was enacted in 1978 to provide oversight of foreign intelligence surveillance activities while maintaining the secrecy necessary to effectively monitor national security threats. FISA established the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) to oversee requests for surveillance warrants by federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies.

FISA has been amended several times since its enactment, including in 2008 with the FISA Amendments Act (FISAAA). This amendment changed the requirements for the government to obtain a court order for surveillance. Previously, the government had to show probable cause that its surveillance target was an agent of a foreign power and that the facility being watched was about to be used by that target.

Under the 2008 FISA Amendments Act, the government only needs to show a "reasonable belief" that the target is located outside of the United States. This lower standard has vastly expanded the scope of "incidental" surveillance, as the government no longer needs to identify specific targets or monitored facilities. As a result, the FISA Amendments Act permits the government to obtain a single court order to monitor thousands, or even millions, of people.

This expansion of surveillance powers has raised concerns about the lack of adequate targeting and oversight. The FISA Amendments Act allows intelligence agencies to gather a vast amount of information "incidental" to any investigations, with minimal court and congressional oversight. This has led to criticism that the Act fails to adequately protect the Fourth and First Amendment rights of American citizens.

While the government insists that data is only collected with court approval and for specific targets, critics argue that the extent of the program and its potential violation of constitutional rights are unclear due to the secrecy surrounding the FISA Court and its operations.

Frequently asked questions